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RECENT DECISIONS
Constitutionai Law-Access to Legislative Department Records
by the Press-The plaintiff, a newspaper reporter, requested the Secre-
tary of the Senate to allow him to inspect and copy certain payroll
records' containing the names and salaries of people employed by
Senators. Upon being refused, he brought an action for a mandatory
injunction requiring the Secretary of the Senate to permit him to
inspect and copy these records. The court dismissed the action on the
ground that: 1) no statutory right to inspect and copy the records
had been granted to the plaintiff, or any other member of the public,
2) freedom of the press does not encompass a right to inspect docu-
ments not open to members of the public generally, 3) there was no
unlawful interference with the plaintiff's constitutional right to pur-
sue his vocation. Trimble v. Johnston, 173 F. Supp. 651 (D.D.C.
1959).
The court dismissed the plaintiff's first contention by pointing out
that under 2 U.S.C. §1032 the only documents to be submitted to
Congress are the results of the returns made by the disbursing officers
and the "sums total." Congress had neither expressly or impliedly
decreed that all of the financial statements were to be regarded as pub-
lic records. Therefore the plaintiff could claim no statutory right.
The second contention of the plaintiff was that freedom of the
press encompasses a right to inspect the records in question. This was
an attempt to obtain judicial recognition of "freedom of information"
as a constitutional right. "Freedom of information" is the alleged
constitutional right of the people to know what the government is
doing, residing by implication in the First Amendment guarantee of
freedom of press and speech and in the Ninth Amendment which pro-
tects rights retained by the people.3 The court refused to accept this
theory.
It would seem that even if there is a right to information pro-
tected by the Constitution, it would not extend to information which
in the interest of the public should not be disclosed. A determination
as to which records fall within this class must be made. By recognizing
"freedom of information" as a Constitutional right to be enforced by
'The statutory provisions relating to these records are found in 2 U.S.C. §103,
5 Stat. 527. Section 103 reads: "The Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk
of the House of Representatives shall each require of the disbursing officers
acting under their direction and authority, the return of precise and analytical
statements and receipts for all the moneys which may have been from time
to time, during the next preceding year, expended by them; and the results
of such returns and the sums total shall be communicated annually to Con-
gress, by the Secretary and Clerk, respectively."2 Supra note 1.
3 Senator Thomas C. Hennings, Jr., Constitutional Law: The People's Right To
Know, 45 A.B.A.J. 667, 670 (1959).
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writs of mandamus or mandatory injunctions directed to the cus-
todian of the records, the court would by necessity assume the task
of deciding which records should be withheld in the public interest.4
Hence, the basic problem involved in recognizing "freedom of in-
formation" as a Constitutional right is not the speculative problem as
to the existence or non-existence of a general right of citizens in a
democracy to know what the government is doing, but the practical
problem of who is to exercise the ultimate discretion as to the release
of government records. The Trimble case by rejecting "freedom of
information" makes clear that this discretion does not lie in the courts.
A statement by the court, however, indicates that the release of gov-
ernment records is to be determined by Congress.
In deciding that the reporter possessed no statutory right to inspect
the records the court said, "Whether any Government records are
open for inspection by the public is, in the first instance, to be de-
termined by the Congress."' (emphasis added). Certainly, as in the
Trimble case, Congress has the power to control its own records.
Although the sweep of the language in the Trimble case might be
interpreted to pertain to all government records, it is doubtful if
Congress can exercise any control over executive records. Such con-
trol is incompatible with the existence of the "executive privilege"
asserted by the attorney generals to exist in the President. Since the
time of President Washington, the "executive privilege" has been used
repeatedly to withhold information from Congress when the President
believed it to be in the public interest.6 The "executive privilege" can
be defined as the power of the President or the head of an executive
department to withhold, in the interest of the public, information and
records of the Executive Branch.7 The exercise of this discretion by
the President or department head is deemed conclusive.8
The "executive privilege" is based upon the separation of powers
doctrine which provides that each of the three branches of government
is supreme in its own area, and no branch can encroach upon the
power of another unless it is exercising one of the explicit "checks"
built into our Constitutional structure.9 The purpose of this doctrine
4 U.S. v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953) held that in passing upon a claim of the
government that records sought by the plaintiff under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure were privileged, the court should use a test similar to that
used in passing upon a claim of privilege against self-incrimination; namely,
to decide the issue from the surrounding circumstances, and the nature of
the records sought. Perhaps this same test could be used if the court assumed
the general discretion as to the release of records where the plaintiff seeks to
be informed.5 Trimble v. Johnston, 173 F. Supp. 651, 654 (D.D.C. 1959).
1 Cross, Harold L., THE PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO KNOW; LEGAL AccESS TO PUBLIC
RECORDS AND PROCEDURES, (1953) at 205 and authorities cited.
7Id. at 203-213.
840 Ops. Att'y. Gen. 45 (1941).
9 Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 191 (1880) where the court states: "It
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is to prevent the concentration of power and tyranny. The "executive
privilege" is nothing more than a name given to the executive depart-
ment's right to control its own records as a necessary adjunct to the
exercise of its constitutional powers.10 Since the executive depart-
ment has exclusive control over its own sphere of activity, and it is
reasonable to hold that its records fall within this scope of activity, it
would seem that Congress cannot force the release of executive de-
partment records without violating the separation of powers doctrine.
In the Trinble decision the Court recognized that the separation of
powers doctrine was a factor to be considered in deciding the case.
One of the underlying reasons for rejecting the "freedom of informa-
tion" theory was the belief that the separation of powers doctrine pre-
cluded the judiciary from interfering with the records of the legisla-
tive branch. It apparently overlooked the fact that this same rationale
applied to the relation between Congress and the executive department,
insofar as it held that the release of any government records was to
be determined by Congress.1
Senator Hennings of Missouri in an article on "freedom of infor-
mation" argued that the separation of powers doctrine could not be
used as a basis for the "executive privilege" where the "executive
privilege" was used to withhold information from the public. He urged
that since the separation of powers doctrine referred only to the rela-
tionship between the three branches of the government, it could not
affect the relation between the people and the Executive Branch. This
argument fails to recognize that any right to information which the
people possess can only be enforced through the judiciary which is
itself subject to the doctrine of separation of powers.
The dispute between the Executive Branch and the Legislative
Branch in regard to the control of the executive department records
is also essential to the successful working of this system that the persons
entrusted with power in any one of these branches shall not be permitted
to encroach upon the powers confided to the others, but that each shall by
the law of its creation be limited to the exercise of the powers appropriate
to its own department and no other."
10 Appeal of Hartranft, 85 Penn. State Rep. 433, 445, 447 (1877) where the
court states: "We had better at the outstart recognize the fact, that the
executive department is a co-ordinate branch of the Government, with power
to judge what should or should not be done, within its own department, and
what of its owfl doings and communications should or should not be kept
secret, and that with it, in the exercise of these constitutional powers, the
courts have no more right to interfere than has the executive, under like
conditions, to interfere with the courts.... We are inclined to think the con-
clusion thus reached is wise and discreet; and is supported by the best text
writers of our time. These state the law to be, that the President of the
United States, the governors of the several states and their cabinet officers,
are not bound to produce papers or disclose information committed to them,
in a judicial inquiry, when, in their own judgment, the disclosure would, on
public gground, be inexpedient (1 Greenf. on Ev., §251; 1 Whart. Law of
Ev., §604)."
11 Supra note 3.
[Vol. 44
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was brought into sharp focus when Congress amended 5 U.S.C. §22.12
This statute had been cited by executive departments and even some
federal agencies as authority for withholding information from the
public and Congress. 13 In order to halt this practice, Congress passed
the Hennings-Moss Act in 1958 which added the following sentence
to 5 U.S.C. 22: "This section does not authorize withholding informa-
tion from the public or limiting the availability of records to the
public."'14 However, upon signing the bill, the President made it clear
that from the legislative history of the act it was not intended to and
in fact could not alter the existing power of an executive department
head to withhold information in the interest of the public.15
The leading case on 5 U.S.C. §22 is Boske v. Comingore"6 which
was a habeas corpus proceeding brought by a United States revenue
collector who was adjudged by a Kentucky court to be in contempt
because he refused, while giving his deposition in a state court, to file
copies of certain reports made by distillers, which reports were in his
possession as a subordinate officer of the Treasury Department. He
based his refusal on a department regulation issued by the Secretary
of the Treasury under 5 U.S.C. §22, which withdrew from subordinate
officers all discretion as to the release of records in their control. The
U.S. Supreme Court held that 5 U.S.C. §22 was constitutional, and
the regulation adopted by the Secretary was valid. The case of Touhy
v. Ragen"1 raised the question, but did not decide, whether 5 U.S.C. §
22 gave to the executive department head power to withhold records.
The language of the Hennings-Moss Act now precludes this construc-
tion.'S A departmental order withdrawing the discretion as to the
12 Act of August 12, 1958, 72 Stat. 547, known generally as the "Hennings-Moss
Act." 5 U.S.C. §22 of the United States Code reads: "The head of each de-
partment is authorized to prescribe regulations, not inconsistent with the law,
for the government of his department, the conduct of its officers and clerks,
the distribution and performance of its business, and the custody, use, and
preservation of the records, papers, and property appertaining to it." The
Hennings-Moss Act added to Section 22 the sentence: "This section does not
authorize withholding information from the public or limiting the availability
of records to the public."
13 S. Rep. No. 1621, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess. 3 (1958).
:
4 Supra note 12.
1S 45 A.B.A.J. 667 (1959).
16 Boske v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 459 (1899).
"7 U.S. ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462 (1951). The United States on the
relation of Roger Touhy brought a habeas corpus proceeding against Joseph
E. Ragen, warden, Illinois State Penetentiary, to secure the release of the
relator. The District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern
Division, rendered an order holding George R. McSwain, a special agent of
the FBI, in contempt of court for refusing to produce records called for in a
subpoena duces tecum, and McSwain appealed. The U.S. Court of Appeals
reversed and remanded the case. Relator brought certiorari. The Supreme
Court held that an order promulgated by the Attorney General under 5
U.S.C. §22 restricting disclosure as to all official documents, records, files, and
information in the offices of the department was valid, and that under the
circumstances, McSwain had properly refused to produce the documents.
18 Supra note 13, at 9.
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release of records from subordinates such as the one in the Boske case
is still valid in spite of the Hennings-Moss Act,19 because a sub-
ordinate relies on the departmental order, not 5 U.S.C. §22, as authority
for withholding information. Testifying before the Subcommittee on
Constitutional Rights, the Attorney General said that the amendment
"wouldn't amount to much" because it would merely prevent people
from incorrectly citing 5 U.S.C. §22 as authority for withholding in-
formation, the true authority being the "executive privilege.
'
"
20
The Trimble case, in conjunction with the "executive privilege,"
leads to the conclusion that the release of government records must
be determined by the branch of government which controls them. This
conclusion will sound harsh to those who advocate less secrecy in
government. However, any attempt to decrease secrecy in government
must proceed with a realization that the separation of powers doctrine
leaves no alternative. The judicial branch of the government in the
Trimble case recognized this fact and followed the wise course of
non-interference.
2 1
FRANCIS SKIBA
Equitable Servitudes: Chattels-Plaintiff purchased from a rail-
road company a quantity of Kraft-brand fruit salad that had become
frozen in transit. Plaintiff agreed he would allow the goods to enter re-
tail outlets under the Kraft label. Plaintiff then sold the merchandise
to a wholesaler with the restriction that the goods were to be removed
from the jars and the jars with caps and cases were to be returned to
plaintiff. Subsequently, a wholesaler sold a portion of the goods to the
defendant. Although defendant had knowledge of the restriction at
the time of sale, he refused to comply with it and sold some of the
goods in the Kraft-jars to retailers. The trial court granted plaintiff
injunctive relief against the defendant upon the basis of broad equitable
19 104 Cong. Rec. 15695 (daily ed. July 31, 1958).
2 Supra note 13 at 5.
21 Occasionally, recognition of the importance of the separation of powers
doctrine in the area of federal records proceeds from Congress. In May of
1948, a resolution came up in the House of Representatives which would have
required the executive department and agencies of the Federal Government,
which had been created by Congress, and those serving in them, to make
available to Congress information which would enable it to legislate, provided
that the request was made by a majority vote of the committee seeking the
information and had been approved by either the Speaker or the president
pro tempore of the Senate. During the debate on the resolution, Representa-
tive Rayburn admonished the House: "Pass this resolution. The President
says to his cabinet officer, 'No, you are my agent, you are my alter ego; do
not give that information to Congress.' What are you going to do about it?
You might have an unseemly row upon the floor of the House of Repre-
sentatives. What are you going to do about it? Are you going to impeach the
President of the United States because he says that the giving up of certain
information is not in the public interest?" This reply can be found in H. Rep.
No. 1461, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess. 19, 20 (1958).
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